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NOTE 
U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON: WHO ARE THE 
PEOPLE AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
Benjamin S. Walton† 
ABSTRACT 
The issue of who formed the Constitution—the people of the United 
States acting as one people group or as many distinct people groups—is an 
issue that directly affects the rights of the American people and the manner 
in which the people may define, exercise, and circumscribe their rights. In 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, several Justices on the United States 
Supreme Court debated whether the people acted as one people group or as 
multiple people groups when they formed the constitutional Union. Justice 
Stevens, who wrote for the majority, did not give a detailed analysis of this 
issue. Thus, the issue remains fairly open, and when it reappears before the 
Court, the Court needs to address it forthrightly, explicitly, thoroughly, and 
correctly. 
The stakes in this debate are high. If the people of America acted as one 
people group to form the Constitution, then they reserved to themselves as 
one body all the rights not delegated to the Federal Government or to the 
state governments. Under this view, the people of Virginia as a corporate 
body have no rights; only the people of America as a whole possess rights, 
and only this national people group can stipulate how those rights will be 
exercised. If rights may be exercised only by the people of the nation as a 
whole, a simple majority of the nation’s populace controls the exercise of 
reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment for all Americans. However, if 
the people of each state may determine how they wish to exercise their 
reserved rights for themselves, this can potentially accommodate the views 
and desires of more people and allow cultural diversity to prevail over 
cultural uniformity and conformity. The manner in which this issue is 
resolved will determine whether America is diverse or uniform respecting 
the exercise of popular rights. 
The historical evidence surrounding the ratification of the Constitution 
strongly supports the proposition that the separate people groups of the 
                                                                                                                           
 † Editor-in-Chief, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 4; J.D. Candidate, Liberty 
University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Whitefield College, 2007. I would like to 
dedicate this Note to my parents, to whom I most assuredly owe the credit for anything I 
achieve in life. 
174 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:173 
 
 
individual states formed the Constitution. The political status of the people 
of the United States before the Constitution was that of thirteen independent 
and sovereign peoples, not of one politically unified mass of people. Thus, 
when the people acted to form the constitutional Union, they were acting as 
numerous separate people groups. Furthermore, the fact that each state 
ratified the Constitution for itself shows that the people of each state acted 
independently of the people of other states in deciding whether the people 
of each state would be subject to the Constitution. A simple majority of the 
American populace as a whole did not make this decision on behalf of the 
entire nation. Also, the official state ratifications of the Constitution 
demonstrate that the people of each state acted self-consciously as such to 
ratify the Constitution for each state individually. Finally, James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson supported the idea of separate states with their own 
politically distinct people groups. 
The evidence is available, and the Supreme Court should recognize it. 
Sovereignty resides in the people—not in the people of the nation as a 
whole, but in the separate peoples of the individual states. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Exactly who are “the people” of the United States? This is a broad 
question, but this Note will examine the political definition of “the people” 
as that phrase is used in the Tenth Amendment.1 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton,2 the United States Supreme Court was divided over the structural 
identity of the people who formed the Constitution. Justice Stevens, writing 
for the majority, seemed to embrace the idea that the people of America 
formed the Constitution as one people group.3 Justice Kennedy wrote a 
concurring opinion in which he explicitly argued that one national people 
group formed the Constitution.4 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas 
argued that the peoples of the several states, as separate people groups, 
formed the Constitution.5 This Note will examine whether the people of the 
United States formed the Constitution as one people group or as thirteen 
separate people groups. 
                                                                                                                           
 1. The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 3. See infra Part III.A. 
 4. See infra Part III.B. 
 5. See infra Part III.C. 
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Why does this debate matter? The way in which one identifies the 
structure of “the people” who formed the Constitution has deeply 
significant ramifications for the manner in which American citizens define 
and exercise their rights. As Justice Henry Baldwin noted in 1837, the 
importance of this issue becomes manifest when one considers “whether a 
state restricts itself, or is restricted by an external power; whether the 
reservations are to the people collectively, or the people of each state.”6 
Reasoning from the idea that reservations in a grant are valid only if made 
by and for the grantor, Baldwin concluded that one of two propositions 
must be true: either “the people of the several states, have now no reserved 
powers, or . . . they are the granting power of the constitution . . . .”7 In 
other words, if the people of America as one national people group formed 
the Constitution and delegated powers to the Federal Government, then the 
peoples of the several states, as such, have no rights at all reserved to them 
under the Tenth Amendment. Conversely, if the peoples of the states 
formed the Constitution as separate people groups, then the people of each 
state possess the rights reserved to “the people” under the Tenth 
Amendment.8 
The implications of this distinction are significant.9 If the rights of the 
people can be exercised only by the people of America acting as one people 
                                                                                                                           
 6. HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DEDUCED FROM THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY AND CONDITION OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, FROM 1774 UNTIL 1788, at 64 
(photo. reprint 2000) (Philadelphia, John C. Clark 1837). 
 7. Id. at 65; see also id. at 64. Baldwin recognized that if the peoples of the several 
states were the grantors of powers to the Federal Government, they, “as grantors, could 
make exceptions to the powers of congress, to their own reserved powers, and reserve what 
was not so granted or excepted.” Id. at 65. Thus, under this view, the people of each state 
hold for themselves the powers reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment; such powers 
are not held by the people of the nation as a whole. 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 9. At least one scholar has denigrated the significance of this issue: 
What useful purpose would be served by embracing the dissent’s claim that the 
“ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of 
each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the 
Nation as a whole”? It is surprising that, in the mid-1990s, four Justices of the 
nation’s highest court were willing to subscribe to such extremes of misguided 
provincialism, oblivious to the consequences that embodiment of these 
principles would entail. 
Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Term Limits, The State Courts, and National Dominion: The 
Vicissitudes of American Federalism, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1567, 1580 (1997) (quoting U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
Notwithstanding Professor Friedelbaum’s assertions, the Introduction to this Note seeks to 
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group, then forty-nine percent of the entire American population will never 
be able to exercise these rights in any way other than that prescribed or 
allowed by the majority of the national populace. However, if the separate 
people groups of the several states individually hold the rights reserved to 
the people under the Tenth Amendment, the people of Virginia can choose 
to exercise their rights in one way, the people of Texas in another, and the 
people of California in yet another. For example, the general right to 
privacy encompasses many specific rights (perhaps we could call them 
“sub-rights”), and different people disagree over the precise manner in 
which these more specific sub-rights are to be defined, exercised, and 
limited. The people of one state may wish to recognize an unlimited right to 
informed consent, while the people of another state may want to 
circumscribe this right in certain ways. The people of one state may wish to 
recognize an unqualified right to bodily integrity, while the people of 
another state may place various restrictions on this right vis-à-vis various 
state interests the people may deem sufficiently compelling to warrant such 
restrictions. Does the power to make these types of decisions reside with 
the people of each individual state, or with a simple majority of the 
American populace? 
If the people of America as a whole possess the power to define and limit 
their reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment, there will be no diversity 
among the states, but rather a rigid uniformity that will stifle political 
experimentation and that may even hamper cultural development. If, 
however, the people of each state may decide for themselves the precise 
contours and boundaries of their own popular rights, the rights of the people 
will not be determined according to a one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, 
American society will be diversified in the manner in which many different 
people groups choose to define, exercise, and restrict their rights. When it 
comes to exercising popular rights, do we want diversity or uniformity 
throughout our vast country with its many millions of inhabitants? This is 
the issue. The debate over whether one people group or several people 
groups formed the Constitution will decide the manner in which Americans 
may exercise their rights.10 
                                                                                                                           
raise some considerations indicating that this very issue is highly important, not only 
theoretically, but also practically in the consequences it logically entails. 
 10. Assuming arguendo that the American people as one single group possess the 
power to define and circumscribe the rights reserved to the people under the Tenth 
Amendment, we must ask how the American people as one large group would be able to 
prescribe the manner in which a particular right would be exercised. The only way for the 
people of America, considered as one large people group, to enact legislation determining 
the manner in which particular rights will be exercised is for their representatives in the 
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This Note proposes and will seek to demonstrate through historical 
evidence that the separate people groups of the individual states, not the 
people of the nation as a whole, formed the Constitution. The sovereignty 
that resides in the people does not reside in the people of America as a 
single group, but in the people of each state as a separate entity. Part II of 
this Note describes the views of this issue taken by the Supreme Court, the 
Senate, and various constitutional scholars in the nineteenth century. Part 
III examines the views of this issue taken by each of the Justices who 
authored an opinion in U.S. Term Limits. Part IV then investigates historical 
evidence relevant to a resolution of this issue. The political status of the 
people of the United States before they ratified the Constitution, the official 
ratifications of the Constitution by the original thirteen states, and the views 
of such notable Founders as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson all 
indicate that the separate people groups of the several states formed the 
Constitution and therefore possess the rights reserved to “the people” under 
the Tenth Amendment. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Since the earliest days of the Union, judges, legislators, and 
constitutional scholars have discussed and debated whether one people 
group or thirteen people groups formed the Constitution. There is no clear 
consensus either in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or in the early 
scholarly commentary on the Constitution as to whether the people of 
America as a whole or the distinct people groups of the several states 
formed the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                           
Federal Congress to act. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 91-92. However, if Congress has 
no jurisdiction over those matters reserved to the people under the Tenth Amendment, the 
people are left with only one means of determining how they will or will not exercise their 
rights: constitutional amendment. If the Constitution is amended to allow the Federal 
Government to pass laws defining or circumscribing a permissible scope of action for its 
citizens, then the people of America can accomplish their objective of prescribing how 
certain rights will and will not be exercised in their society. However, the process of 
amending the Constitution is extremely difficult and unlikely to occur very often. More 
importantly, a constitutional amendment delegating additional power to the Federal 
Government means that the people no longer possess that newly delegated power. This 
means that in order to exercise their reserved rights, the people of America have to give up 
the power over that right to the Federal Government. This result seems to contradict the very 
spirit of the Tenth Amendment. Proponents of the idea that the people of America formed 
the Constitution as a single people group should consider carefully the full implications of 
their position. 
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A. The Supreme Court 
Chief Justice John Marshall appears to have embraced the idea that the 
people of America, acting as one unified whole, formed the Constitution. It 
is unclear, however, whether the Court after Marshall has agreed with his 
view. 
 1. The Marshall Court 
In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall authored two opinions for the Court that 
addressed in part the subject of who the parties to the Constitution were. 
According to Marshall, the Constitution was formed by one American 
people. In Sturges v. Crowninshield,11 Marshall stated that the Federal 
Government was created by “the American people.”12 Although this phrase 
by itself does not conclusively indicate whether Marshall was referring to 
one people mass or to many separate people groups, he proceeded to clarify 
his intended meaning. Speaking of the powers reserved to the states, 
Marshall wrote that “[t]hese powers proceed, not from the people of 
America, but from the people of the several states . . . .”13 In other words, 
Marshall maintained that the powers of the individual state governments 
proceed from the different people groups of the several states, but that the 
powers of the Federal Government proceed from the people of America as a 
whole. 
In McCulloch v. Maryland,14 decided a mere two-and-a-half weeks after 
Sturges,15 Marshall explicitly rejected the proposition advanced by 
Maryland that the Constitution was formed by “the act of sovereign and 
independent states,” instead of by the people themselves.16 Maryland 
contended that the powers of the Federal Government proceeded from the 
states.17 Marshall, however, pointed out that the state legislatures merely 
elected the members of the Constitutional Convention, whereas the people 
were the ones who actually ratified the Constitution.18 The states submitted 
the Constitution to the people, so that the people themselves could decide 
whether to adopt the Constitution.19 Once ratified by the people, the 
                                                                                                                           
 11. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
 12. Id. at 193. 
 13. Id.  
 14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 15. Sturges was decided on February 17, 1819, and McCulloch on March 7, 1819. 
 16. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-03. 
 17. Id. at 402. 
 18. Id. at 403-05. 
 19. Id. at 403-04. 
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Constitution “bound the state sovereignties,” who could not override the 
decision of the people.20 
Marshall’s point in McCulloch is not exactly the same point he appears 
to have made in Sturges. In McCulloch, Marshall specifically refuted the 
idea that the state governments were the parties to the Constitution. 
Marshall insisted that the people were the proper parties to the Constitution. 
It is unclear simply from the language in McCulloch whether Marshall 
would have opposed the proposition that the peoples of the several states 
acting as separate groups, rather than the people of America acting as a 
whole, formed the Constitution. However, it is indeed possible to interpret 
Marshall’s references in McCulloch to “the people” as conveying the sense 
of one single entity.21 This interpretation of Marshall’s language in 
McCulloch is supported by his opinion in Sturges, where he clearly 
contrasted “the people of America” with “the people of the several states,” 
and asserted that it was “the American people” who created the Federal 
Government.22 According to Marshall, therefore, the people of America 
formed the Constitution as one entity.23 
                                                                                                                           
 20. Id. at 404. 
 21. Id. at 402-05. 
 22. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819). 
 23. Some of Chief Justice Marshall’s language in McCulloch is problematic for his 
apparent view that the people of America as a whole formed the Constitution. Marshall 
states that “the people had already surrendered all their powers to the state sovereignties, and 
had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the 
powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this country.” McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404. If the people had to resume certain powers from each of the original 
thirteen state governments in order to transfer those particular powers to the Federal 
Government in the Constitution, this implies the Constitution was formed by the people 
groups of the several states, rather than by one national people group. The people of New 
York, the people of Georgia, or the united “people of America” as a whole cannot revoke the 
powers of the Delaware state government and re-grant those powers to the Federal 
Government. Only the people of Delaware themselves, who originally “surrendered all their 
powers” to the Delaware state government, can rightfully revoke those powers and re-grant 
them to the Federal Government. Marshall’s language here necessarily implies that the 
Constitution was formed by the people groups of the several states, yet he does not seem to 
realize the latent inconsistency between his clear language in Sturges and this particular 
statement in McCulloch. Since the interpretational conflict is between a fairly clear assertion 
in Sturges and an implicit conclusion from certain language in McCulloch, it seems fair to 
say that Marshall’s view was indeed that the people of America acted as one people group to 
form the Constitution. This is therefore the view this author is attributing to Marshall. 
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 2. The Court After Marshall 
After the Marshall era, the Court only rarely and sporadically 
commented on the nature of the Union. The few times the Court did discuss 
the nature of the Union, it did not clearly adopt the position Justice 
Marshall had expressed in 1819. In his dissenting opinion in the Passenger 
Cases in 1849,24 Chief Justice Roger Taney observed that “[f]or all the 
great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed, we are one 
people, with one common country.”25 Reading this statement in isolation, 
one might conclude that Taney viewed the Constitution as having been 
formed by one people group. However, this interpretation of Taney’s 
statement is not the only reasonable one. Taney made this assertion in the 
context of his contention that United States citizens have the right freely to 
travel in and to engage in commerce with every part of the Union.26 As 
Taney observed, the Constitution was formed “to secure the freest 
intercourse between the citizens of the different States.”27 For the purpose 
of achieving free intercourse and each of the other “great purposes for 
which the Federal Government was formed,” Taney asserted that the 
American people are “one people.”28 This means that now that the 
Constitution has been formed, United States citizens are treated as one 
people group for certain purposes. However, it is not clear whether Taney 
intended his reference to “one people” to mean that the Constitution itself 
was actually formed by one people, or even whether United States citizens 
are “one people” for all purposes, instead of merely for those specific 
purposes for which the Constitution was formed. It is unclear whether 
Taney would have said that the people of the United States are one people 
or several peoples in the specific context of exercising the rights reserved to 
the people under the Tenth Amendment.29 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Although 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the Passenger Cases was a dissenting opinion rather than a 
majority opinion, the Court later observed that the statements in Taney’s opinion discussed 
here were consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence in general. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 
(6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867). The Court quoted approvingly from this portion of Taney’s opinion 
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969). Thus, the Court has explicitly 
recognized the validity of the portion of Taney’s dissent discussed here. 
 25. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. If the American people are one people only for those purposes for which the 
Constitution was formed, this would seem to imply that they are not one people for purposes 
of the Tenth Amendment. This is because the purposes for which the Constitution was 
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In the 1920 case of Hawke v. Smith,30 the Court stated that “the people” 
ordained the Constitution, and that “[t]he states surrendered to the general 
government the powers specifically conferred upon the nation . . . .”31 One 
might interpret “the people” here to mean one people group, but the Court’s 
reference to the states surrendering powers to the Federal Government 
seems to imply that the states were parties to the Constitution. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not specify the precise manner in which states 
are parties to the Constitution. Did the states surrender certain powers 
because the state governments agreed to do so, or because the people of the 
states determined their state governments must do so? Later in its opinion, 
the Court noted that “the state and its people . . . alike assented” to the 
Constitution.32 Again, the Court did not explain its precise meaning. Did the 
states and the people assent to the Constitution in the same way? Were the 
states parties to the Constitution just as the people were? Or, were the 
people the ones who formed the Constitution, while the states merely gave 
a type of assent that was not conclusive as far as the formal validity of the 
Constitution was concerned? Marshall would have agreed that the states 
“assented” to the Constitution, but he did not view the states as actually 
being parties to the Constitution. It is not clear whether the Court in Hawke 
intended to contradict Marshall’s view that the states were not themselves 
parties to the Constitution. It is plausible, however, to read the Court’s 
language in Hawke to imply that both the states and the people were parties 
to the Constitution. 
Regardless of whether Hawke is interpreted to assert that the state 
governments themselves were parties to the Constitution, it does seem as 
though the Court viewed the people who formed the Constitution as being 
the peoples of the several states, rather than one unified people group. This 
may be inferred from the Court’s affirmation that it was “the state and its 
people” that assented to the Constitution.33 Interestingly, the Court did not 
                                                                                                                           
formed involve the powers delegated to the Federal government in the Constitution, but do 
not involve the powers reserved to the people or the states. If the people reserve certain 
powers to themselves that they do not deem necessary or prudent to delegate to the Federal 
government, this implies that these reserved powers are not necessary to the fulfillment of 
the specific purposes for which the people are forming a Federal government. Thus, the 
Tenth Amendment does not implicate the specific purposes for which the Constitution was 
formed. This means that if the people of the United States are one people only for those 
purposes for which the Constitution was formed, they are not one people for purposes of the 
Tenth Amendment and the exercise of reserved powers. 
 30. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
 31. Id. at 226. 
 32. Id. at 230. 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
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say that the states and the people of America assented to the Constitution. 
Rather, the Court spoke of a particular state and the people of that state as 
being the ones who assented to the Constitution. It is not entirely clear 
whether this necessarily implies the Court in Hawke viewed the peoples of 
the several states as the parties to the Constitution, but this is certainly a 
reasonable interpretation of the Court’s language in Hawke. 
B. The Senate Resolutions of 1838 and 1860 
The issue of whether the people of America as a whole or the peoples of 
the several states formed the Constitution has not been definitively settled 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, the Senate did address this 
issue in 1838 and again in 1860. According to the nineteenth-century 
Senate, it was the peoples of the several states who formed the Constitution. 
In a series of resolutions in 1838, the United States Senate clearly set 
forth its own view of who the parties to the Constitution were. The first of 
these resolutions declared that the states were the ones who had adopted the 
Constitution, “and that each [state], for itself, by its own voluntary assent, 
entered the Union . . . .”34 According to the second resolution, the states 
were the ones who delegated “a portion of their powers to be exercised by 
the Federal Government . . . .”35 If this were not clear enough, the third 
resolution forthrightly affirmed that “[the Federal] Government was 
instituted and adopted by the several States of this Union as a common 
agent, in order to carry into effect the powers which they had delegated by 
the Constitution for their mutual security and prosperity . . . .”36 In other 
words, the states were the ones who delegated powers to the Federal 
Government in the Constitution. Again, the fourth resolution declared that 
the states gave a “pledge to protect and defend each other, . . . on entering 
into the constitutional compact which formed the Union . . . .”37 According 
to the Senate in 1838, therefore, the states themselves were parties to the 
Constitution. 
Was the Senate contradicting the idea Marshall had articulated nineteen 
years earlier in McCulloch, that the people and not the state governments 
were the parties who had formed the Constitution? It is certainly not 
necessary to interpret these resolutions as opposing the idea that the people 
themselves formed the Constitution. Rather, when the Senate referred to 
“states,” it is entirely plausible to interpret such a reference as connoting the 
                                                                                                                           
 34. S. Res. 1, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838). 
 35. S. Res. 2, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838). 
 36. S. Res. 3, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838). 
 37. S. Res. 4, 25th Cong., 6 CONG. GLOBE 98 (1838). 
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peoples of the several states, rather than the governments of the several 
states. The thrust of these Senate Resolutions appears to be that the Union 
does not consist of one people mass ruled by one government, but that the 
Constitution was formed by separate entities, i.e., by states acting as distinct 
societal groups. 
The Senate Resolutions of 1838 were not an unrepeated aberration in 
nineteenth-century legislative activity. In 1860, the Senate again passed a 
set of resolutions, the first of which affirmed that the states adopted the 
Constitution, “[acting] severally as free and independent sovereignties,” and 
“delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the Federal 
Government.”38 The Second Resolution explicitly said that the states 
entered “into the constitutional compact which formed the Union” and gave 
mutual pledges and incurred “solemn obligations” to one other.39 The Third 
Resolution referred to “the union of these States,” rather than speaking of a 
union of “people.”40 
Thus, the Senate in 1838 and again in 1860 expressly affirmed the idea 
that the states formed the Constitution and are members of the Union. 
According to the Senate in the nineteenth century, the states delegated to 
the Federal Government the powers it possesses. While it is not clear 
whether the Senate meant that the states as people groups or the states as 
established governments formed the Constitution, it is certainly reasonable 
to interpret the Senate’s pronunciations to mean that the states, acting as 
distinct sovereign societal groups, formed the Federal Government. This 
interpretation of the Senate Resolutions of 1838 and 1860 is consistent with 
the other historical evidence presented in this Note. 
C. Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Scholars 
The Supreme Court and the United States Senate are not the only sources 
of opinions on and disagreements over the nature of the Union. Several 
noted constitutional scholars of the nineteenth century expressed different 
opinions on who formed the Constitution. Unfortunately, there was no 
absolute consensus on this issue, although several scholars appear to have 
supported the view that the people groups of the several states formed the 
Constitution. 
                                                                                                                           
 38. S. Res. 1, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860). 
 39. S. Res. 2, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860).  
 40. S. Res. 3, 36th Cong., 29 CONG. GLOBE 2321 (1860). 
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 1. William Rawle 
In 1825, William Rawle explained his view that with the adoption of the 
Constitution, “[t]he people of the states unite[d] with each other, without 
destroying their previous organization.”41 Rawle appears to have been 
saying that the people of each state united with the peoples of each of the 
other original thirteen states to form the Union, without destroying the 
organization of the state people groups as distinct societies. Rawle also 
stated that the Federal Government “is a society formed not only out of the 
people of other societies, but in certain parts, formed by the societies 
themselves.”42 Rawle asserted that both the states and the people are 
“member[s] of the Union.”43 Regardless of whether one agrees with 
Rawle’s view that the state governments themselves participated in forming 
the Federal Government, it is significant to note that Rawle viewed the 
people who formed the Constitution as consisting of people of separate 
societies who came together “without destroying their previous 
organization” as distinct societal entities.44 According to Rawle, therefore, 
the peoples of the several states united to form a Federal Government, and 
they did not thereby obliterate the fact that they were distinct societies. 
Perhaps the most revealing statement from Rawle is his reference to the 
fact that it was the people of each particular state who transferred to the 
Federal Government the powers it possesses. Rawle’s exact language is: 
“[E]very state must be viewed as entirely sovereign in all points not 
transferred by the people who compose it to the government of the Union . . 
. .”45 Significantly, Rawle did not say that the people of America transferred 
powers to the Federal Government. Rather, he indicated that the people 
who compose each particular state acted as a state to transfer powers to the 
Federal Government. Rawle thus seems to have embraced the view that the 
peoples of each state acted as distinct bodies in forming the Constitution. 
 2. Joseph Story 
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,46 Justice 
Joseph Story clearly rejected the idea that the state governments formed the 
                                                                                                                           
 41. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
40 (Walter D. Kennedy & James R. Kennedy eds., Land & Land Publishing Division 1993) 
(1825). 
 42. Id. at 41. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 40. 
 45. Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added). 
 46. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(photo. reprint 1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
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Constitution.47 He also firmly rejected the idea that the separate people 
groups of the several states formed the Constitution.48 In support of his 
position that the people of America as a whole formed the Constitution, 
Story placed great weight on the language of the Preamble of the 
Constitution, which states that “the people of the United States” ordained 
and established the Constitution.49 Story distinguished “the people of the 
United States” as used in the Preamble from “the distinct people of a 
particular state with the people of the other states.”50 Story approvingly 
quoted Daniel Webster as maintaining, “So far from saying, that [the 
Constitution] is established by the governments of the several states, it does 
not even say, that it is established by the people of the several states. But it 
pronounces, that it is established by the people of the United States in the 
aggregate.”51 According to Story, therefore, the people of America as a 
whole, not the separate people groups of the several states, formed the 
Constitution. 
 3. Henry Baldwin 
In 1837, Justice Henry Baldwin published a short work in which he 
contended that the peoples of the several states, and not the people of 
America as a whole, formed the Constitution.52 According to Baldwin, “The 
people of a state, who had by their state constitution, granted the power of 
legislation to their state legislatures; had plenary power, to take from them 
such portions as they pleased, and by their grant vest them in a federal 
legislature.”53 In other words, Baldwin maintained that the people of each 
particular state revoked certain powers they had previously granted to their 
individual state government, in order to re-grant these powers to a new 
Federal Government.54 In Baldwin’s view, the people of each state took this 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Id. at 281 n.2: “The constitution was neither made, nor ratified by the states, as 
sovereignties, or political communities. It was framed by a convention, proposed to the 
people of the states for their adoption by congress; and was adopted by state conventions,—
the immediate representatives of the people.” 
 48. Id. at 319. 
 49. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 50. 1 STORY, supra note 46, at 319; see also id. at 327. 
 51. Id. at 332. The quote from Webster proceeds: “Doubtless the people of the several 
states, taken collectively, constitute the people of the United States. But it is in this their 
collective capacity, it is as all the people of the United States, that they establish the 
constitution.” Id.  
 52. BALDWIN, supra note 6. 
 53. Id. at 44. 
 54. Id. at 44-45. 
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action for themselves as a people group distinct from the people groups of 
the other states.55 
 4. Thomas Cooley 
Writing in 1880, Thomas Cooley, a noted expositor of the Constitution 
in his day, affirmed that the people of the several states formed the 
Constitution and were parties to it.56 Cooley noted that the Constitution 
“was submitted to the people of the several States” for ratification.57 By 
adopting the Constitution thus submitted to them, “the people of the States, 
as well as the States themselves, . . . became parties to it.”58 Furthermore, 
Cooley maintained that the powers not granted to the Federal Government 
in the Constitution “belong[] to the several States or to the people 
thereof.”59 Cooley did not say that non-delegated powers belong to “the 
people of America,” but rather that they belong to the people of “the several 
States.”60 When placed alongside his previous statement that the people of 
the several states ratified the Constitution, this subsequent statement 
apparently means that it is the distinct people groups of the several states, 
not one mass of people, who possess the powers not delegated to the 
Federal Government. 
Several important nineteenth-century constitutional scholars believed the 
people groups of the several states formed the Constitution. At least one 
notable exception among these scholars was Justice Story, who believed the 
people of America acted as a unified whole in forming the Constitution. 
This issue has not been settled definitively by the Supreme Court, although 
it was addressed on two occasions by the United States Senate in the 
nineteenth century. Is it possible to address this issue today with any 
sureness and authority? Or is it hopelessly and forever irresolvable? 
                                                                                                                           
 55. See, e.g., id. at 12-13, 44-45, 62, 97. 
 56. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 26-27 (photo. reprint 2000) (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1880). 
 57. Id. at 26. 
 58. Id. at 26-27. 
 59. Id. at 29 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 
(1865); Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)). 
 60. Id. 
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III.  THE CONTEMPORARY RESURRECTION OF THE DEBATE IN U.S. TERM 
LIMITS, INC. V. THORNTON 
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,61 the Supreme Court held it was 
unconstitutional for Arkansas to amend its Constitution to prohibit 
candidates for the United States Congress from appearing on the general 
election ballot in Arkansas for more than a specified number of terms.62 
Justice Stevens penned the majority opinion;63 Justice Kennedy wrote a 
concurring opinion; and Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion.64 
From these various opinions, it is evident that the Justices disagreed over 
whether the Constitution was formed by one people group or by many 
people groups. This Part will examine the Justices’ views in turn. 
A. Justice Stevens 
Although Justice Stevens does not spend much time developing or 
defending his view, his statements indicate that he believes one American 
people group formed the Union. This is apparent from several observations. 
First, Stevens quotes Marshall’s language in Sturges that the powers of the 
states “‘proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of 
the several States . . . .’”65 In the context of Sturges, as noted above, this 
language indicates that Marshall believed the people of America as a whole, 
not the peoples of the several states, formed the Constitution.66 Stevens 
appears to adopt Marshall’s position. 
Second, Stevens maintains that the states reserved to themselves and 
currently possess only those powers they originally possessed before the 
Constitution was adopted.67 Stevens treats the issue in U.S. Term Limits as 
                                                                                                                           
 61. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 62. Id. at 783. 
 63. Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer. Id. at 781. 
 64. Justice Thomas was joined in his dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor and Scalia. Id.  
 65. Id. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819)). 
 66. See supra notes 11-13, 22 and accompanying text. 
 67. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801-02. Stevens relies on several authorities for this 
proposition: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549 
(1985) (“[T]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority. 
They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their 
original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.”); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430, 436 (1819); 2 STORY, supra note 46, at 101-02 
(“[T]he states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the 
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whether the asserted right to fix representatives’ term limits is a right 
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.68 Apparently, he does 
not consider the notion that the people of Arkansas can possess and exercise 
certain rights that the Tenth Amendment reserves to them as “the people” 
and not simply to the state governments. Rather, Stevens concludes that if 
states are to be permitted “to craft their own qualifications for [their 
Congressional representatives],”69 the Constitution must first be amended to 
allow such state-imposed qualifications.70 Since Stevens treats the issue as 
simply whether the right to add qualifications to those imposed by the 
Constitution is reserved to the states,71  instead of also considering whether 
such a right is reserved to the people, he is apparently assuming that “the 
people” of the Tenth Amendment are not the people of a particular state, 
such as Arkansas. If “the people” in the Tenth Amendment referred to the 
individual people groups of the several states, Stevens’ analysis would be 
patently incomplete. It is probable, therefore, that Stevens views “the 
people” as being the one people of America as a whole.72 
Third, Stevens asserts as a “basic principle” that “the right to choose 
representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people.”73 The context 
of this statement indicates that Stevens’ understanding of “the people” here 
is that they are one national entity.74 Furthermore, Stevens states that in the 
case at hand, “the voters of Arkansas . . . were acting as citizens of the State 
of Arkansas, and not as citizens of the National Government. The people of 
the State of Arkansas have no more power than does the Arkansas 
                                                                                                                           
existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . . 
No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.”). 
 68. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 800 (“[W]e conclude that the power to add 
qualifications is not within the ‘original powers’ of the States, and thus is not reserved to the 
States by the Tenth Amendment.”). 
 69. Id. at 838. 
 70. Id. at 783, 838. 
 71. Id. at 800-01. 
 72. This implication from Stevens’ mode of analysis obtains further support from the 
fact that Stevens maintained that the right to impose state-specific qualifications on 
Congressional representatives may be permitted by constitutional amendment. Id. at 783, 
838. The process of constitutional amendment is a national process. Presumably, Stevens 
would recognize that it is the people who act, through their representatives, to amend their 
Constitution. Thus, perhaps implicit in Stevens’ analysis is the idea that the right to impose 
additional qualifications on representatives is a right possessed by the people of America as 
a whole, not by the states, and that the American people can exercise this right by amending 
their Constitution. 
 73. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 820-21. 
 74. Id. at 821-22. Consider, for example, this statement by Stevens: “The Constitution 
thus creates a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people.” Id. at 822. 
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Legislature to supplement the qualifications for service in Congress.”75 
From this assertion it is evident that Stevens does not interpret “the people” 
in the Tenth Amendment to mean (among other peoples) the people of 
Arkansas. Apparently, Stevens’ framework for interpreting the Tenth 
Amendment is that “the states” in the Tenth Amendment refer to the 
governments or the populaces of the individual states, and that “the people” 
refers to all of the “citizens of the National Government” acting as one 
group.76 
B. Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy is quite explicit and unequivocal in expressing his view 
on who formed the Union: “In my view . . . it is well settled that the whole 
people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of 
purpose when they created the federal system.”77 Again: “[T]he National 
Government . . . owes its existence to the act of the whole people who 
created it.”78 According to Kennedy, it was the people of America acting en 
masse, and not the peoples of the several states, who formed the Union. 
Referring to “a relationship between the people of the Nation and their 
National Government, with which the States may not interfere,”79 Kennedy 
apparently interprets this relationship between the Federal Government and 
                                                                                                                           
 75. Id. at 822 n.32. 
 76. In addition to the statements of Stevens already discussed, there is another statement 
that supports this understanding of Stevens’ view. Stevens maintains the Framers intended 
“that neither Congress nor the States should possess the power to supplement the exclusive 
qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution.” Id. at 827. Since the people of 
Arkansas attempted to exercise this power, and Stevens denied the validity of this attempt on 
the grounds that the “states” do not possess this power, Stevens is implicitly viewing the 
people of a particular state as falling under the same category (that of a “state” for purposes 
of the Tenth Amendment) as a state government, rather than under a different category (that 
of “people”). 
 77. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Kennedy proceeds to 
criticize Justice Thomas’ dissent (which maintains that thirteen people groups formed the 
Constitution) in these words: “The dissent’s course of reasoning suggesting otherwise might 
be construed to disparage the republican character of the National Government, and it seems 
appropriate to add these few remarks to explain why that course of argumentation runs 
counter to fundamental principles of federalism.” Id. Evidently, Kennedy deems this issue 
important enough to deal with more explicitly in his concurring opinion than Stevens does in 
the majority opinion. As Kennedy observes, this issue implicates the very heart of the 
American system of government, concerning as it does “the republican character of the 
National Government” and “fundamental principles of federalism.” Id.  
 78. Id. at 839 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 845. 
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the American people as a whole to mean that the people of Arkansas 
cannot, as the people of a single state, intrude upon ground that belongs 
exclusively to the Federal Government or to the entire people of America.80 
The important point to note from Kennedy’s reasoning is that there seems 
to be three possible repositories of rights or powers: the Federal 
Government, the states, or the American people conceived of as one entity. 
For Kennedy, the people who can relate to, respond to, and act with respect 
to the Federal Government are the American people en masse, not the 
distinct peoples of the several states. 
C. Justice Thomas 
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas makes his position clear: “The 
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people 
of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of 
the Nation as a whole.”81 Thomas maintains that “the people of each 
State”—not the people of America as a whole—possess “the power to 
prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent 
them in Congress.”82 
Thomas defends his view by appealing to the manner in which the 
Constitution was originally ratified.83 As Thomas explains, “The 
Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in 
convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect 
only ‘between the States so ratifying the same’; it did not bind the people of 
North Carolina until they had accepted it.”84 In other words, Thomas is 
saying that the very nature of the ratification process implies that the people 
of America did not act as one undifferentiated whole to ratify the 
Constitution.85 
                                                                                                                           
 80. Id. at 844-45. 
 81. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 845. 
 83. Id. at 846. Thomas also cites James Madison in support of the proposition that the 
people of the several states formed the Constitution. Thomas cites THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, 
at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), as well as Madison’s remarks at the 
Virginia ratification convention, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 94 (photo. reprint 1996) (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed., 
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 84. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VII). 
 85. Indeed, one may further observe that since Article VII of the Constitution did not 
require unanimous ratification by the states for the Constitution to become effective, it was 
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According to Thomas, “the people of each State” adopted the 
Constitution and in so doing “surrendered some of their authority to the 
United States.”86 Thomas’ words here express the view that it was not the 
people of America as a whole who delegated powers to the Federal 
Government. Rather, Thomas is arguing that the Federal Government 
derives its powers from the numerous distinct people groups of those states 
that ratified the Constitution. In Thomas’ view, “the people of the several 
States are the only true source of power . . . .”87 For Thomas, therefore, 
power rests with the people of each individual state, not with the people of 
America en masse.88 
Thomas interprets the Tenth Amendment to mean that all powers not 
delegated to the Federal Government “reside at the state level.”89 In 
Thomas’ words, “All powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the 
Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people 
of each State.”90 Essentially, Thomas is saying that the powers reserved to 
“the people” under the Tenth Amendment are reserved to the people of each 
individual state, not to the people of America as a whole. The peoples of the 
states hold the reserved powers, not the people of the nation. In fact, 
Thomas asserts that “it would make no sense to speak of powers as being 
reserved to the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole, because 
the Constitution does not contemplate that those people will either exercise 
power or delegate it.”91 Thomas maintains that the Constitution does not 
provide for any type of action to be taken by the people of America acting 
as one undifferentiated mass of people.92 
                                                                                                                           
not even certain historically that the Constitution would end up binding all of the people of 
America, instead of merely binding the people of nine states. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia ratification convention). 
 86. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id.  
 88. See also id. at 851 (“The Constitution derives its authority . . . from the consent of 
the people of the States. [It is a] fundamental principle that all governmental powers stem 
from the people of the States . . . .”). 
 89. Id. at 848. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
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IV.  THE SOLUTION TO THE DEBATE AS PROVIDED BY HISTORICAL 
RECORDS 
Much is at stake with the interpretation of “people” in the Tenth 
Amendment.93 The proper interpretation of “people” depends on the 
political status of “the people” before the Constitution was formed, as well 
as the manner in which “the people” ratified the Constitution. Also, it is 
helpful to ascertain the views of certain prominent Founding Fathers 
regarding the political composition of “the people” of the United States. An 
investigation of this historical evidence will demonstrate that “the people” 
who formed the Constitution94 and “the people” who possess reserved 
powers under the Tenth Amendment95 are the distinct people groups of the 
several states, not one undifferentiated, national people group. 
A. The Pre-Constitutional Political Status of the People 
To ascertain the pre-constitutional legal status of the people of the 
United States, it is necessary to examine such key historical documents as 
the Declaration of Independence,96 the Articles of Confederation,97 and the 
Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain in 1783.98 
These documents demonstrate the way in which the people of the United 
States viewed themselves during the years immediately preceding the 
adoption of the Constitution.99 
 1. The Declaration of Independence 
The title of the Declaration of Independence itself asserts that this 
document is a declaration of thirteen states, not of one political entity: “The 
unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America.”100 
Moreover, the signers of the Declaration referred to themselves as “the 
Representatives of the United States of America,”101 indicating that they 
viewed themselves as representing a group of states, not a single entity. The 
                                                                                                                           
 93. See supra Part I. 
 94. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 96. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 97. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (U.S. 1781). 
 98. The Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, TREATIES AND 
CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, 
SINCE JULY 4, 1776, at 314-18 (photo. reprint 2006) (rev. ed., Washington, Government 
Printing Office 1873) [hereinafter Treaty of Peace]. 
 99. The Constitution was drafted in 1787. 
 100. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 101. Id.  
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Declaration speaks of “one people” and “the People” in the context of 
general principles of legal philosophy applicable to all peoples at all times 
in history.102 Notably, however, when the Declaration begins to apply these 
general principles to the specific situation in America in 1776, it speaks of 
“the patient sufferance of these Colonies” and of “the necessity which 
constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government.”103 This 
language indicates that the signers of the Declaration of Independence 
viewed the people of the United States to be acting as separate and distinct 
people groups in achieving their political separation from Great Britain. It 
was the colonies, not the nation, who altered their governments. 
Presumably, each colony had to act for itself to alter its own “system of 
government,” since the people of one colony would have had no legal right 
to participate in the process of changing the political system of another 
colony. The people of each individual colony had to alter that colony’s 
“system of government” for themselves. 
Another indication in the Declaration of Independence that the people of 
the United States were not simply one undifferentiated people group in 
1776 may be found in the following language: “[T]hese United Colonies 
are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; . . . as [such], 
they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, 
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which 
Independent States may of right do.”104 In other words, each state asserted 
the right to exercise the full powers of an independent nation, including the 
powers to wage war, negotiate peace, make treaties, and establish 
international commerce. Thus, before the adoption of the Articles of 
Confederation in 1781, the American states were not formally united in a 
legal or political way. Under such a situation, it is difficult to maintain that 
the people of America comprised one undifferentiated people group that 
acted as one popular mass. How can a people be viewed as one entity 
instead of as thirteen separate entities when there are no legal bonds 
actually uniting that people?105 The more sensible understanding seems to 
                                                                                                                           
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. Id.  
 105. Even if one assumes arguendo that the adoption of the Constitution was a legal 
bond uniting the people of the United States into one single people group for all purposes 
thereafter, one must realize that the Constitution could not actually have been formed by one 
people group. If the Constitution was what united the people of America into a single people 
group, then they were not one people group before the Constitution made them so. In the act 
of forming and adopting the instrument that made them one people group, the people could 
not yet have been acting as one people group. Thirteen people groups may act as thirteen 
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be that with the Declaration of Independence, the people of the United 
States consisted of thirteen separate and independent people groups, who 
when they acted, had to act as independent groups rather than as a simple, 
single body. 
 2. The Articles of Confederation 
The Articles of Confederation formed a limited general government over 
the American states in 1781. The Articles were unequivocally formed by 
the state governments themselves, not by the people.106 Thus, the only 
document creating a pre-constitutional legal bond between the states was 
created by the state governments, not by the people. There is no basis for 
supposing that the political composition of “the people of the United 
States” changed with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. If after 
the Declaration of Independence and before the Articles of Confederation, 
“the people” consisted of the people groups of the several states, 
independently considered, the adoption of the Articles did nothing to alter 
this situation. The actions of the state governments in uniting for certain 
specified, limited purposes could not have imposed a radical change in the 
basic structural composition of the people. If independent people groups are 
to be united into one undifferentiated people group, this act of structural 
redefinition, to be valid, must be performed by the people themselves.107 
The people of the United States did not alter their structural composition 
when their state governments adopted the Articles of Confederation. 
 3. The Treaty of Peace with Great Britain 
Two years after the Articles of Confederation were adopted in 1781, the 
United States and Great Britain entered into a peace treaty that formally 
concluded the American War for Independence.108 The language in this 
Treaty indicates that the people of the United States were viewed by both 
                                                                                                                           
people groups to make themselves one people group, but thirteen people groups cannot act 
as one people group to make themselves one people group. Rather, they only become one 
people group after they have completed the legal and political act that actually makes them 
one people. 
 106. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (U.S. 1781); see id. art. III (stating that the states 
are the ones entering into “a firm league of friendship with each other”); id. art. XIII 
(indicating that the signers of the Articles understood that each of them represented the 
legislature of his own state). 
 107. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments . . . 
deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed, . . . [and] it is the Right of the 
People . . . to institute new Government . . . .”). 
 108. Treaty of Peace, supra note 98. 
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King George III and the United States Government as a collection of 
distinct people groups belonging to particular states. 
In Article I of the Treaty, King George “acknowledges the said United 
States, viz. [the original thirteen states listed by name], to be free, sovereign 
and independent States . . . .”109 Two important points should be noted here. 
First, the “United States” were not presented as one homogeneous nation, 
but as a collection of individual states that had banded together. Today, 
people think of one national government when they refer to the “United 
States.” This Treaty, however, used the term “United States” to refer to 
thirteen distinct, free, and independent states. Second, this formal Treaty 
explicitly recognized that the United States were “free, sovereign and 
independent States.”110 This idea logically precludes the notion that the 
people of America were one undifferentiated whole. How can a single 
political constituency be governed by thirteen sovereign political entities 
that are independent of one another? In 1783, the people of the United 
States could not have been one undifferentiated whole, at least for political 
purposes.111 
Article VII of the Treaty refers to “His Britannic Majesty and the said 
States” and then proceeds to mention “the subjects of the one and the 
citizens of the other.”112 Thus, the people of the United States were viewed 
as being citizens of their respective states, not as citizens of one national 
government. Not only were the United States independent political 
governments, but also the people themselves were citizens of those 
individual, free states, not of one common political government. For 
political purposes, the people of America were not one people before the 
Constitution was adopted, but thirteen distinct peoples. The question now 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Id. at 315. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Of course, the people of the United States at that time were very closely united in 
terms of their religion and culture. People groups that are ruled by separate political 
governments can be united in non-political ways. For example, a common religion, such as 
Christianity or Islam, may unite peoples from different nations. In a sense, European 
Christians living in the Middle Ages were one people. Indeed, a people united by a common 
religion or common culture would probably feel a greater sense of unity than would a people 
simply united by a common political government. This is so because culture, beliefs, and 
ideas are more fundamental to human nature and identity than political governance. A sense 
of political unity will not necessarily overcome fundamental differences in thought and 
culture. There are many different ways in which a people may be spoken of as “one people.” 
This Note is simply examining whether the American people were “one people” in the 
political sense of that phrase. 
 112. Treaty of Peace, supra note 98, at 317. 
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becomes whether the people consolidated themselves into one political 
popular entity when they formed the Constitution. 
B. The Ratification Process 
On its face, the very process by which the Constitution was ratified 
demonstrates that the people of the United States did not act as one 
undifferentiated people in the formation of their Constitution.113 If the 
people of each state could decide for themselves and for their own state 
whether they would be part of the new Federal Government, this implies 
that even an overwhelming majority of the American people could not force 
the entirety of the people in America to be ruled by the Constitution.114 
Moreover, the Constitution only required the consent of “the Conventions 
of nine States” to establish the Constitution “between the States so ratifying 
the Same.”115 In other words, the people of America did not have to decide 
                                                                                                                           
 113. Henry Baldwin explained this argument eloquently when he wrote that it would be 
erroneous 
if we so take the words of the preamble of the proposed constitution, as to be a 
declaration that the political existence, and organic power of the several states 
and people, had become so amalgamated into one body of supreme power, as 
to make it the sole grantor of the powers of the federal government, and 
competent to restrict the states, and control existing state constitutions. Their 
letter to congress, and of the latter to the several state legislatures, asking 
separate conventions of the people in each to ratify it; was an act indicating 
political fatuity, if the instrument contained, and was intended to be a 
declaration, that when ratified by such conventions of nine states, and thus 
established, it was not “by the people of the several states,” but of all 
collectively. 
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 62; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239-40 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison stated, “Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is 
considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own 
voluntary act.” Id. at 240. Madison viewed the process of state-by-state ratification as 
demonstrating that the formation of the Constitution was “the act of the people, as forming 
so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation.” Id.  
 114. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia 
ratification convention). In Madison’s words: 
Were [the Federal Government under the Constitution] a consolidated 
government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its 
establishment; and, as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining states 
would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated 
it. Were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the 
people of this state, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it. 
But, sir, no state is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. 
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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as a whole whether they would all be ruled by the Constitution. Rather, the 
people of each state were to make this decision for themselves.116 As Henry 
Baldwin observed, “all must agree, that when [the Constitution] was 
proposed for adoption in 1787, it could not be foreseen which of the states 
would so ratify it; the states therefore could not be named till their separate 
ratifications were given.”117 Thus, Baldwin concluded that the reference in 
the Constitution’s Preamble to “the People of the United States”118 is an 
adaptable phrase that refers generally to the people of those states that have 
chosen to ratify the Constitution.119 According to Baldwin, the Preamble 
should be interpreted to mean that “‘[t]he people’ ‘of the several states, 
which may be included within this Union,’ [are] the constituent power of 
the federal government.”120 
C. The Ratification Conventions 
The formal ratifications of the Constitution by the original thirteen states 
indicate that the representatives of the people in each of the state ratification 
conventions understood that they were acting on behalf of the people of 
their own respective states. 
 1. Delaware121 
In Delaware’s ratification of the Constitution, the delegates identified 
themselves as “the deputies of the people of the Delaware state, in 
Convention met.”122 They declared that they ratified the Constitution “in 
virtue of the power and authority [given to them], for and in behalf of 
[themselves] and [their] constituents.”123 Thus, the delegates in the 
Delaware convention understood that they were acting on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                           
 116. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (James Madison’s remarks at the Virginia 
ratification convention) (“[N]o state is bound . . . without its own consent.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see BALDWIN, 
supra note 6, at 97. 
 117. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 97. 
 118. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 119. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 97. Baldwin stated that “at each period when any state 
ratified [the Constitution],” that state “became one of ‘the United States of America,’ by the 
act of the people of the states respectively.” Id. Baldwin also maintained that “the term 
‘people,’ was a mere designation of the power by which the constitution was made.” Id. 
Baldwin viewed the term “people” in the Preamble as simply signifying that the Constitution 
was ratified by the people as opposed to some other alleged source of authority. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. This Note will discuss the state ratifications in their chronological order. 
 122. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 319. 
 123. Id.  
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people of the state of Delaware. There was no pretention on their part to be 
acting as an incomplete portion of a larger, undifferentiated people group. 
The power of the Delaware delegates came from their “constituents,” the 
people of Delaware. The people of Delaware, through their elected 
representatives, acted on their own to ratify the Constitution for themselves. 
Their ratification bound only themselves. It was up to the other twelve 
states to ratify the Constitution, each on its own behalf. 
 2. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania’s ratification was similar to Delaware’s. “[T]he delegates 
of the people of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” ratified the 
Constitution “in the name and by the authority of the same people, and for 
[the delegates themselves].”124 The Pennsylvania delegates understood they 
were acting for the people of Pennsylvania. There is no indication in the 
language of their ratification that they viewed themselves as merely one 
segment of a larger homogeneous popular entity. The delegates derived 
their authority from the people of Pennsylvania, not from the people of the 
United States, and as the heading of their ratification declared, they ratified 
the Constitution “In the Name of the People of Pennsylvania.”125 Evidently, 
the people of Pennsylvania constituted a political entity that could act as 
one body either to accept or to reject the new Constitution. 
During the debates in the Pennsylvania convention, James Wilson, one 
of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the Constitutional Convention, offered some 
remarks on the Preamble of the new Constitution and its significance. 
Wilson stated that the Preamble incorporates the principle that “the supreme 
power resides in the people.”126 Contrasting the nature of British and 
American government, Wilson noted that under the Magna Charta, the 
rights of Englishmen were granted to them by the king, whereas under the 
American Constitution, the rights of American citizens resided in “the 
people at large,” who did not relinquish their rights by forming the 
Constitution.127 Thus, Wilson concluded that a Bill of Rights enumerating 
the rights reserved to the American people “would be not only unnecessary, 
but preposterous and dangerous.”128 Besides referring to “the people at 
large,”129 Wilson also declared that “in this Constitution, the citizens of the 
United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what 
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 126. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 434. 
 127. Id. at 435. 
 128. Id. at 436. 
 129. Id. at 435. 
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manner and what proportion they think fit.”130 Again, Wilson asserted, “[t]o 
every suggestion concerning a bill of rights, the citizens of the United States 
may always say, We reserve the right to do what we please.”131 
It is unclear whether Wilson was intending by his references to “the 
citizens of the United States” and “the people at large” to contrast the 
people of America as a whole with the peoples of the several states. At the 
very least, it is evident from the context that Wilson was contrasting the 
people as the source of their rights with the civil government as the source 
of political rights. However, even granting that Wilson viewed the people 
of the United States as one undifferentiated whole, this does not imply that 
the other Pennsylvania delegates agreed with Wilson on this point. Rather, 
the plain language of the delegates acting as a group in their ratification of 
the Constitution declared that they were acting “in the name and by the 
authority of the [people of Pennsylvania],”132 not on behalf of a mere subset 
of a larger entity. The clear language of Pennsylvania’s official ratification 
discussed above is more authoritative than an argument based on 
implications from one delegate’s personal language. Even if Wilson viewed 
the people of America as one simple people mass, the other Pennsylvania 
delegates certainly gave no indication that they agreed with Wilson on that 
point. Indeed, the language of Pennsylvania’s ratification indicates the 
delegates generally viewed the people of Pennsylvania as a politically 
independent entity. 
 3. New Jersey 
The New Jersey ratification cited the resolutions by the New Jersey 
legislature regarding the holding of a ratification convention in that state. 
One of these resolutions declared that the delegates elected to the 
convention would have power to ratify the Constitution “in behalf and on 
the part of this state.”133 In other words, it was the state of New Jersey (i.e., 
the people of New Jersey acting through their elected delegates) that 
ratified the Constitution. Acknowledging themselves to be “the delegates of 
the state of New Jersey, chosen by the people thereof,” the delegates 
ratified the Constitution “for and on the behalf of the people of the said 
state of New Jersey.”134 Thus, the New Jersey delegates understood 
themselves to represent their own state (i.e., the people of the state), not a 
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 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
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accompanying text. 
 133. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 320. 
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portion of a larger political entity. In ratifying the Constitution, the 
delegates were acting on behalf of and expressing the will of the people of 
New Jersey. Their decision to ratify the Constitution bound only the people 
group of New Jersey. 
 4. Connecticut 
Connecticut’s ratification was quite brief. The delegates identified 
themselves as “the delegates of the people of [the] state [of Connecticut]” 
and declared that they ratified the Constitution.135 Significantly, just as the 
Pennsylvania ratification had done,136 the Connecticut ratification contained 
a heading that read, “In the Name of the People of the State of 
Connecticut.”137 In other words, the people of the state of Connecticut 
viewed themselves as a self-contained body that could meet separately from 
the peoples of the other states and decide for themselves as an independent 
people group whether to ratify the new Constitution. 
 5. Massachusetts 
The Massachusetts delegates stated that they ratified the Constitution “in 
the name and in behalf of the people of the commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.”138 Thus, the people of Massachusetts came together as a 
body through their delegates and gave their corporate assent to the 
Constitution. There is some language in Massachusetts’ ratification that 
seems upon first glance to intimate the view that the people of America 
were a single entity. The delegates referred to the opportunity of “the 
people of the United States” to “enter[] into an explicit and solemn compact 
with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution.”139 One 
might interpret this language to mean that the Massachusetts delegates 
viewed the people of America as acting as one large group to form the 
Constitution. However, this interpretation seems implausible when one 
considers certain other language in Massachusetts’ ratification. 
Interestingly, the Massachusetts convention recommended several 
amendments to the Constitution, the first of which was: “That it be 
explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid 
Constitution are reserved to the several states, to be by them exercised.”140 
The Massachusetts convention thus was concerned to clarify that non-
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delegated powers were reserved to the states. Although the Tenth 
Amendment says that non-delegated powers “are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people,”141 Massachusetts did not mention the people 
as a reservoir of non-delegated rights. Since it was the people of 
Massachusetts, acting through their delegates, who ratified the Constitution, 
it would not make much sense to interpret their recommendation to mean 
that each state government possesses all powers the Federal Government 
does not possess. Rather, it seems more reasonable to interpret 
Massachusetts’ proposed amendment to mean that the peoples of the states 
possess all powers they do not expressly delegate to the Federal 
Government. If the people of Massachusetts were adopting the 
Constitution, they would naturally want to clarify their own reserved rights. 
The people of Massachusetts apparently viewed reserved rights as residing 
in the peoples of each individual state, not in the people of America as a 
single whole. This is why they could say that “all powers not expressly 
delegated . . . are reserved to the several states . . . .”142 
 6. Georgia 
Identifying themselves as “the delegates of the people of the state of 
Georgia,” the delegates to the Georgia convention ratified the Constitution 
“in virtue of the powers and authority [given to them] by the people of the 
said state for that purpose, for and in behalf of [themselves] and [their] 
constituents.”143 The people of Georgia vested their delegates with power to 
ratify the Constitution for and on behalf of the people of Georgia. There is 
no indication here that the people of Georgia or their delegates viewed 
themselves as acting as a mere district of a larger political entity, instead of 
as a politically independent and self-contained people group. 
 7. Maryland 
Maryland’s ratification is short. The delegates stated they were “the 
delegates of the people of the state of Maryland,” and then declared that 
they ratified the Constitution “for [themselves], and in the name and on the 
behalf of the people of [the] state [of Maryland].”144 The Maryland 
delegates were explicitly acting for the people of their state as a whole. The 
idea that they were acting as a mere voting district of a larger populace is a 
notion that must be read into their actions, for it does not appear upon the 
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face of their language. Rather, the prima facie sense of Maryland’s 
ratification (as well as the other states’ ratifications) is that the people of an 
independent, sovereign state met via their delegates and decided as an 
independent body that they would join the new constitutional Union. 
 8. South Carolina 
South Carolina’s ratification was typical. It began, “In Convention of the 
people of the state of South Carolina, by their representatives . . . .”145 The 
Convention ratified the Constitution “in the name and behalf of the people 
of [the] state [of South Carolina].”146 Like Massachusetts, the South 
Carolina convention declared that nothing in the Constitution “warrants a 
construction that the states do not retain every power not expressly 
relinquished by them, and vested in the general government of the 
Union.”147 According to this language from the South Carolina convention, 
the states were the parties who relinquished certain powers which were then 
vested in the Federal Government. However, the South Carolina convention 
was explicitly acting on behalf of the people, not the state government, of 
South Carolina.148 It is not reasonable to interpret the South Carolina 
convention as saying that the people of South Carolina ratified the 
Constitution, but that any rights the people did not give the Federal 
Government were retained by the state government.149 Rather, the 
reasonable interpretation of South Carolina’s declaration that the states 
retain non-delegated powers is that the people of each individual state retain 
all powers not delegated to the Federal Government. If the people are the 
ones delegating certain powers, then it must be the people who are the ones 
retaining all non-delegated powers. 
 9. New Hampshire 
The “Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of New 
Hampshire”150 ratified the Constitution “in the name and behalf of the 
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 149. How can a state government retain what it did not have in the first place? If all non-
delegated rights are retained by the state governments, then this logically implies that the 
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 150. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 325 (from the heading of New Hampshire’s 
ratification). 
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people of the state of New Hampshire.”151 In addition to Massachusetts and 
South Carolina, New Hampshire was another state that recommended a 
constitutional amendment regarding reserved rights. New Hampshire 
proposed: “That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly and 
particularly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the 
several states, to be by them exercised.”152 New Hampshire did not say that 
non-delegated powers were reserved to the American people as a whole, but 
to “the several states.” Surely the delegates representing the people of New 
Hampshire were not asserting that all powers not delegated to the Federal 
Government necessarily resided in the state governments. Rather, the 
people of New Hampshire evidently wanted to reserve rights to themselves 
as a people. While Americans of the founding era generally understood that 
people have rights, many of them apparently viewed these rights as residing 
in the separate people groups of the several states, not in one national 
people group en masse. 
 10. Virginia 
The delegates of the Virginia ratification convention, “the delegates of 
the people of Virginia, duly elected,”153 ratified the Constitution “in the 
name and in behalf of the people of Virginia.”154 Again, the people of this 
particular state155 ratified the Constitution for themselves as a distinct 
people group. There is some language in Virginia’s ratification that upon a 
cursory glance seems to indicate that the American people are one single 
people group. The delegates maintained that “the powers granted under the 
Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be 
resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or 
oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with 
them.”156 One might wish to interpret “the people of the United States” here 
as indicating the people of America conceived of as one single entity. 
However, Virginia proposed the following amendment to the Constitution: 
“That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the 
[Federal Government].”157 Once again, an original ratifying state insisted 
that the powers not delegated to the Federal Government were retained by 
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each respective state in the Union. As noted above with respect to similar 
amendments proposed by other states,158 it is much more reasonable to 
interpret the term “state” in this context as referring to the people of each 
individual state, rather than to the government of each state, especially 
since the Virginia ratification spoke of “the people of the United States” as 
retaining all powers not granted to the Federal Government by the 
Constitution.159 If Virginia can say that “the people” retain non-delegated 
powers, and that “each state” retains non-delegated powers, then “the 
people” must mean the people of each state, not the people of the nation as 
a whole. 
 11. New York 
The members of New York’s ratification convention identified 
themselves as “the delegates of the people of the state of New York, duly 
elected,”160 and ratified the Constitution “in the name and in the behalf of 
the people of the state of New York.”161 The New York convention made 
numerous declarations in its ratification, including the declaration “that 
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the . . . Constitution 
clearly delegated to the [Federal Government], remains to the people of the 
several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may 
have granted the same . . . .”162 This statement seems to resemble the Tenth 
Amendment more closely than the proposed amendments by other states 
considered above. New York’s language straightforwardly expresses the 
understanding that non-delegated powers are reserved to the people groups 
of each state as such, not to the people of America as a single entity. 
According to New York’s declaration here, the people of each state possess 
all powers they have not delegated to either the Federal Government or 
their own state government. 
 12. North Carolina 
North Carolina and Rhode Island were the only original states that did 
not ratify the Constitution until after the Federal Government was already 
established under the new Constitution.163 A North Carolina convention 
ratified the Constitution on November 21, 1789, “in behalf of the freemen, 
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citizens and inhabitants of the state of North Carolina.”164 A previous North 
Carolina convention that had failed to ratify the Constitution had proposed 
numerous amendments to the Constitution, the first of which was: “That 
each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the [Federal 
Government].”165 As with many states already examined,166 North Carolina 
viewed the people and governments of each state, not the people of the 
country as a whole, as retaining the rights not delegated to the Federal 
Government. Rights that belong to “each state in the Union . . . 
respectively”167 may belong to either the people or the government of each 
state, but they logically cannot belong to the people of America considered 
as one undifferentiated people group. 
 13. Rhode Island 
Finally, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790.168 
“[T]he delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, duly elected,”169 ratified the Constitution “in the name and in 
the behalf of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations.”170 There are some places where the Rhode Island delegates 
generically mentioned “the people,” which by itself could be interpreted as 
referring to either one people group or many people groups. The delegates 
affirmed that “all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived 
from, the people,”171 and that “the powers of government may be reassumed 
by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.”172 
Immediately after these statements, however, the delegates made it clear 
who “the people” were to whom they were referring: 
[T]he rights of the states respectively to nominate and appoint all 
state officers, and every other power, jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to [the 
Federal Government], remain to the people of the several states, 
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or their respective state governments, to whom they may have 
granted the same . . . .173 
The Rhode Island delegates understood that the people of the several states, 
not the people of the nation acting as one single entity, were the source of 
the Federal Government’s powers and the repository of all non-delegated 
powers. 
In its ratification, Rhode Island also proposed various amendments to the 
Constitution, the very first of which was: “The United States shall guaranty 
to each state its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated 
to the United States.”174 Even if one interprets the language here of 
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence” to refer to the rights and powers 
of the state governments instead of the rights and powers of the people, one 
cannot fairly interpret the Rhode Island delegates as saying that “every 
power, jurisdiction, and right” that is not delegated to the Federal 
Government resides in the state governments. This interpretation would 
leave the people themselves no rights or powers at all, but would relegate 
all rights and powers to either the Federal Government or the state 
governments. As noted above with respect to similar amendments proposed 
by other states,175 this language is most reasonably interpreted to mean that 
the people of each respective state possess the rights and powers they have 
not delegated to either their state government or the Federal Government. 
The important point, however, is to note that the language both of this 
amendment proposed by Rhode Island and of similar amendments proposed 
by other states cannot grammatically be interpreted to refer to one great 
national body of people possessing rights en masse as a single entity. Rhode 
Island specifically asserted that non-delegated powers reside with states in 
their individual capacity, which precludes the notion that rights reside in a 
national people group. 
Thus, the delegates in every single one of the original thirteen states 
ratified the Constitution on behalf of the people of their own state. 
Delegates representing the people of each state came together 
independently of the people of other states and decided whether to adopt the 
Constitution for their own state. Five of the original thirteen states proposed 
amending the Constitution to recognize essentially that non-delegated rights 
and powers were retained by the people of the several states or their state 
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governments.176 Two other states made declarations to this same effect.177 
The evidence surrounding the actual ratification of the Constitution by the 
individual state ratification conventions strongly suggests the conclusion 
that the people of the United States did not act as a single political people 
group to ratify the Constitution, but rather acted as politically independent 
people groups to ratify the Constitution, each state for itself. 
D. The Views of Particular Founding Fathers 
In addition to the preceding historical evidence concerning the pre-
constitutional political status of “the people” and the state ratification 
conventions, the views of two prominent statesmen during the Founding 
Era further demonstrate that the people of America were not viewed as one 
homogeneous political entity. Statements by both James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson indicate that these Founders viewed the people of the 
United States as composed of separate political entities—the people groups 
of the several states. 
 1. James Madison 
During the debates in the Virginia ratification convention, James 
Madison made the following clarification regarding who the parties to the 
Constitution were: “Who are the parties to [the Federal Government under 
the Constitution]? The people — but not the people as composing one great 
body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. . . . [N]o state is 
bound by it . . . without its own consent.”178 Madison was unequivocal: “the 
people” who formed the Constitution were not one undifferentiated people 
group, not a single national entity, but rather an aggregate of numerous 
sovereign people groups. According to Madison, the people of the United 
States were acting not as “one great body,” but as many separate bodies, 
each of whom was sovereign in its own right. 
In The Federalist No. 39, Madison asserted that “the Constitution is to be 
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America.”179 Whom 
did Madison view as “the people of America” in this regard? “[T]his assent 
and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing 
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to 
                                                                                                                           
 176. See supra notes 140-42 (Massachusetts), 152 (New Hampshire), 157-59 (Virginia), 
165-67 (North Carolina), 174-75 (Rhode Island) and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 147-49 (South Carolina), 162 (New York) and accompanying text. 
 178. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 94 (emphasis added). 
 179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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which they respectively belong.”180 Thus, for Madison, “the people of 
America” formed the constitutional Union not as one national people group, 
but as separate people groups composing the several states. Madison 
continued, “It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, 
derived from the supreme authority in each State—the authority of the 
people themselves.”181 Since Madison did not view the people of America 
as one people group, but rather as numerous people groups, he could say 
that the states ratified the Constitution. He could not have said that the 
states ratified the Constitution if a single national people group actually 
formed the Constitution. 
Madison authored the Virginia Resolutions of 1798,182 in which the 
General Assembly of Virginia declared “that it view[ed] the powers of the 
federal government as resulting from the compact to which the states are 
parties, as limited . . . .”183 Madison here again maintained that the states 
themselves were parties to the Constitution. Given Madison’s insistence in 
the Virginia ratification convention debates and in The Federalist No. 39 
that the people ratified the Constitution, it is only reasonable here to take 
his reference in the Virginia Resolutions to “the states” as meaning the 
peoples of the several states, rather than the state governments. 
 2. Thomas Jefferson 
The primary author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas 
Jefferson, evidently believed that the people of the United States were not 
one national people group, but separate state people groups. Jefferson 
drafted the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799,184 the first of which 
declared that “the several states . . . by compact . . . constituted a general 
government for special purposes, [and] delegated to that government certain 
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to 
their own self-government . . . .”185 Regardless of whether one interprets 
Jefferson’s reference to “the several states” here to mean the state 
governments or the peoples of the individual states, Jefferson’s words 
certainly cannot mean that one national people group formed the compact 
establishing the new Federal Government. 
The first resolution also asserted that “to this compact each state acceded 
as a state, and is an integral party,” and that “as in all other cases of 
                                                                                                                           
 180. Id.; see also id. at 240. 
 181. Id. at 239 (emphasis added). 
 182. Contained in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 528-29. 
 183. Id. at 528 (emphasis added). 
 184. Contained in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 83, at 540-45. 
 185. Id. at 540. 
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compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal 
right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of 
redress.”186 In other words, Jefferson was saying that the states are the 
parties to the Constitution, and that each state is to judge for itself whether 
the Federal Government has transgressed its constitutional bounds in a 
given situation. For Jefferson, the right to determine the boundaries of the 
Federal Government’s constitutional powers resides with the states 
individually.187 Thus, any state may challenge the Federal Government’s 
usurpation of unconstitutional power,188 regardless of what a majority of the 
people of America as a whole think of the matter. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Political sovereignty in American government ultimately resides with the 
people. But who are the people? The way in which one answers this 
question is critical, for it determines who has the power to exercise the 
rights reserved to “the people” under the Tenth Amendment. If the people 
who formed the Constitution were one national people group, then any 
rights reserved by the people to themselves may only be exercised as 
prescribed by a majority of the American populace. However, if the people 
who formed the Constitution were the several people groups of independent 
states, then the rights reserved to the people may be defined, exercised, and 
circumscribed in different ways, according to the different desires of the 
peoples of different states. 
The historical evidence examined in this Note demonstrates that the 
people who formed the Constitution were the separate people groups of the 
several states. Justice Thomas is correct. Justices Stevens and Kennedy 
appear to be mistaken. If the Supreme Court does not explicitly recognize 
that the peoples of the several states formed the Constitution, the ability of 
American citizens to exercise their rights in the manner they desire will be 
severely burdened. The peoples of different states will not be free to 
exercise their rights in different ways according to their different desires, 
but all people throughout the United States will have to bow to the will of a 
bare majority of American citizens. This is not the freely diverse country 
the Founders envisioned. It is a consolidated and restrictively conformist 
nation. The issue of who formed the Constitution is not an arcane, pedantic, 
                                                                                                                           
 186. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 187. Id.  
 188. This is exactly what Kentucky and Virginia did with their resolutions in 1798 and 
1799. These states were protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 83, at 528, 545. 
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meaningless debate. On this issue rests the very nature of American society 
itself—whether it will be diverse from state to state or uniform throughout 
the country. 
When this issue reappears before the Supreme Court, what will the Court 
do? Will it continue to embrace the line of reasoning that logically requires 
America to be a conformist society, or will it embrace the Founders’ vision 
of a diverse American society? 
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